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Abstract
Voters sometimes vote for seemingly less qualied candidates; the winners of elec-
tions are sometimes less competent than the losers in light of candidates' observable
characteristics such as their past careers. To explain this fact, we develop a political
agency model with repeated elections in which a voter elects a policy maker among
candidates with dierent competency (valence) levels. We show that politicians' com-
petency relates negatively with political accountability when the challenger in the future
election is likely to be incompetent. When this negative relation exists, voters prefer
to elect an incompetent candidate if they emphasize politicians' policy choices over
their competency. The negative relation between competency and accountability is
possible because voters cannot commit to future voting strategies. Furthermore, vot-
ers' private information about how they evaluate candidates' competency generates a
complementary mechanism leading to the negative relation between competency and
accountability. This mechanism implies that voters' anti-elitism can be rational ex post
even if it is groundless in the rst place.
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1 Introduction
Candidates regarded by voters as less competent have won several elections, and voters'
preference for incompetent politicians has been remarkable in recent years. For example, a
survey by Di Tella and Rotemberg (2016) shows that in the 2016 U.S. presidential election,
citizens elected Donald Trump knowing that Trump did not understand policies compared
with Hillary Clinton. In the survey conducted before the election, only 12 % of subjects
agreed that Trump understands policies more than Clinton, while 65% of subjects agreed
that Clinton understands policies more than Trump. Furthermore, considering past political
career, Trump did not have any elective experience, while Clinton had held a senate seat
for eight years and had served as Secretary of State for four years. The 2016 presidential
election is not an exceptional case; when we measure candidates' political experience by past
career as a senator, a governor, or vice-president, U.S. voters have consistently elected less-
experienced candidates in presidential elections since 1996 (Rauch 2015). The electoral surge
of Five Star Movement in Italy, led by the comedian Beppe Grillo, also illustrates the rise
of amateur politicians. On the back of repeated corruption scandals, Five Star Movement
criticized existing politicians, and \[i]n this framework, political inexperience is considered
a strength rather than a weakness" (Mosca 2014, p. 44). Dustmann et al. (2017) also argue
that the erosion of trust in existing politicians and political institutions causes the rise of
populist parties, which are generally new and inexperienced.
Existing theories provide the reason why incompetent individuals can hold political oces
in a democracy, but their explanation focuses on the entry of individuals into politics (Caselli
and Morelli 2004; Messner and Polborn 2004; Mattozzi and Merlo 2015; Besley et al. 2017).1
Although the entry side of political selection is important, the above examples illustrate that
voters do not always elect the most competent candidate among the pool of candidates in
an election, which means that the quality of a politician in an oce can be low even if high
quality individuals have incentives to run for oce.
This paper aims to explain theoretically why and when voters elect a less competent
candidate. To this end, we extend a two-period political agency model a la Besley (2006),
incorporating the following three structures: (i) politicians dier in observable competency
levels, in addition to unobservable policy preferences, (ii) an open seat election is introduced
before the rst policy choice to determine the incumbent's competency level, and (iii) voters
have private information about how they evaluate politicians' competency. Specically,
a competent and an incompetent candidate contest the rst election. After choosing a
policy, the winner contests with a new challenger, and the winner of the second election
again chooses a policy. The voters' payos depend on the competency levels of the elected
politicians and the chosen policies, and how much the voters give weight to the politicians'
1Competent individuals may be less likely to run for oce due to their high opportunity cost of being
politicians (Caselli and Morelli 2004; Messner and Polborn 2004). Political parties might recruit mediocre
individuals to maximize party members' incentives to exert eort for the party (Mattozzi and Merlo 2015)
or to secure a leader's survival, which would be threatened by the entry of competent individuals (Besley et
al. 2017).
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competency is the voters' private information: one type of voter (type-C) gives the highest
priority to the candidates' competency and always votes for a candidate with the highest
competency level, while the other type (type-P) weighs the candidates' competency against
their expected policy choices. As in Besley (2006), the voters cannot observe the politicians'
policy preferences, and the politicians' policy compromise to the voters can be a signal of
shared preferences, which increases their probability of re-election.
We show that politicians' incentive to cater to voters' policy preferences can be inversely
related to their competency levels; due to this negative relation between competency and
accountability, voters prefer the incompetent candidate if they place emphasis on account-
ability. The reason behind the negative relation between competency and political repre-
sentation is that voters cannot commit to re-election strategies. For example, when the
incumbent is less competent than the challenger, the voters may elect the challenger even
though the incumbent has chosen the voters' preferred policy. Similarly, when the incumbent
is more competent than the challenger, the voters may re-elect the incumbent even though
the incumbent has not chosen the voters' preferred policy. As a result, when the future
challenger is less likely to be competent, the incompetent incumbent has an incentive to act
in the voters' interest, while the competent incumbent does not. In the open seat election in
the rst period, the voters cast their ballots considering these politicians' incentives. Hence,
when the negative relation between competency and accountability is expected, the voters
prefer to elect the incompetent candidate if they emphasize the policy choice of the elected
politicians rather than their competency.
The voters' private information generates a complementary mechanism leading to the
negative relation between the politicians' competency and their representation of the voters'
preferences. To explain this result, assume that the voters' electoral choice in the rst
election is dierent between their types: the type-C voters elect the competent candidate,
while the type-P voters elect the incompetent candidate. Then, the winning candidate can
identify the voters' type from the electoral result; after winning, the competent candidate
perceives that the voters place the maximum value on his or her competency. As a result,
the competent candidate will pursue his or her own interest, sacricing the voters' interest,
in the policy choice stage because of the perception that his or her advantage derived from
competency will dominate the next election. Given this policy choice, it can be optimal for
the voters to elect the incompetent candidate if they place suciently great importance on
the policy choice.2 Then, the voters' separating strategy assumed in the rst place becomes
optimal.
This self-fullling mechanism implies that the voters' anti-elitism can be rational ex post
even if it is groundless in the rst place. When voters mistrust the policy choice of elite
politicians for some reasons, allowing these politicians to win makes them perceive that
they can win because the voters highly evaluate their high level of competency. Since this
perception undermines politicians' accountability, it becomes rational for voters to distrust
2For the voters to elect the incompetent candidate, it is necessary that the incompetent politician has an
incentive to compromise to voters, which is assured when the future challenger is less likely to be competent.
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elite politicians. The economic downturn since the nancial crisis in 2008 is often said to be
the cause of the rise of anti-establishment parties in Europe (Algan et al. 2017; Dustmann et
al. 2017; Guiso et al. 2017), but it is not obvious whether existing politicians are responsible
for the economic downturn. Our model explains why it is dicult to dispel voters' distrust
against existing politicians even though this distrust emerges from baseless suspicion.
Our model also yields several empirical predictions. First, incompetent candidates are
more likely to be elected when a sharp policy conict exists between the decisive voters and
other citizens. When policy conict is severe, voters' policy payos vary greatly depending
on whether their preferred policy is chosen or not. In this situation, voters care much
about policy choice, which makes the election of incompetent candidates more likely. This
theoretical prediction is a possible explanation for why U.S. voters have consistently elected
less experienced candidates as their presidents since mid-1990s. The recent progress of
globalization has intensied policy conicts around trade and immigration, and these are
often said to be the cause of Trump's win in the 2016 election. The second prediction is
that competent candidates are more likely to win in the case where the expected quality of
the future challenger is high. This is because the entry of a competent challenger enhances
the accountability of the competent incumbent but undermines that of the incompetent
incumbent. The third prediction is that the eects of term limit on politicians' behavior
depend on their competency. In the separating equilibrium, the incompetent politician has
an incentive to compromise to voters for re-election, while the competent politician does not.
Hence, the incompetent politician is more likely to change policies in the last term where he
or she does not need to seek re-election. Finally, we predict that the incompetent politician
is less likely to be elected when the reward for the politician is large enough. When the
reward is large enough, politicians in oce choose voters' preferred policy to get re-elected
regardless of their competency levels, which eliminates the behavioral dierence between
competent and incompetent politicians. Thus, voters elect competent candidates in this
case.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section relates this paper to the
existing literature. Section 3 describes the environment of the model, and Section 4 solves
it. Section 5 discusses the empirical predictions of the model. Section 6 empirically tests the
prediction of the term-limit eect. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Related literature
The model of this paper is related to the political agency models with hidden types of politi-
cians (Rogo 1990; Banks and Sundaram 1993; Besley and Case 1995a; Coate and Morris
1995; Besley 2006; Besley and Smart 2007).3 As is described in Introduction, this paper is
dierent from these studies in the following three ways: (i) politicians dier in observable
competency levels, in addition to unobservable types, (ii) an open seat election is introduced
3The pioneering work on political agency has been done by Barro (1973), Ferejohn (1986), and Austen-
Smith and Banks (1989).
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before the rst policy choice to determine the incumbent's competency level, and (iii) voters
have private information. The open seat election is introduced to analyze the voters' choice
of the candidates' competency. The voters' private information generates the interaction
between their voting strategies and the incumbent's accountability. The extension in the
rst way is also analyzed by Padro-i-Miquel and Snowberg (2012). Incorporating politicians'
valence into a political agency model, they analyze how the re-nomination decision by party
members is related with the political accountability of the incumbent. The mechanism in
our model through which the voters' commitment problem generates the negative relation
between competency and accountability is similar to their argument.4 However, unlike their
model, the voters have private information about how they emphasize the politicians' com-
petency, and the incumbent's belief about the voters' type aects the incumbent's tradeo
between rent-seeking and re-election. Furthermore, this study analyzes politicians' account-
ability to general voters rather than their party members, and our primary interests are to
analyze voters' choice of politicians' competency levels.
There are several studies that analyze when voters demand incompetent politicians (Buis-
seret and Prato 2016; Di Tella and Rotemberg 2016; Buisseret and Van Weelden 2017; Eguia
and Giovannoni 2017; Kishishita 2017; Mattozzi and Snowberg 2018).5 While most of these
studies assume that competent candidates have some innate dierences from incompetent
candidates besides competency, this paper shows that voters prefer a less competent candi-
date in an election even if candidates' characteristics are identical, except for their compe-
tency, from the voters' perspective. In this sense, Buisseret and Prato (2016) is the closest
to this study; they show why candidates' incompetency in itself can be benecial to voters.
They provide a model in which politicians use their time to serve voters in their constituency
or to achieve benets for their faction in the legislature. They show that the strategic comple-
mentarity in politicians' factional activities makes it dicult for voters to control politicians
as their quality rises. Since the strategic interdependency among politicians, who are elected
from dierent districts, is the key to the mechanism, the focus of Buisseret and Prato (2016)
is on politicians in legislatures. On the other hand, the mechanism proposed in this paper
shows that the negative relation between competency and accountability can occur in the
environment where voters elect a single policy maker.
This paper also relates to the literature on the role of candidates' valence in electoral
4Another strand of literature on political accountability indicates voters' commitment problem in the
context of an innite-horizon model with term limits (see Bernhardt et al. (2004) and Duggan and Martinelli
(2017).
5Demand for incompetent politicians is related to populism. Populism contains citizens' anti-elitism as
an important aspect, and populist parties generally lack political experience. Thus, this paper is also related
with recent studies on populism (see, among others, Acemoglu et al. 2013; Algan et al. 2017; Dustmann 2017;
Guiso et al. 2017; Karakas and Mitra 2017). Karakas and Mitra (2017) argue that ideological extremism
allows outsider candidates to commit to radical policy shifts more credibly than establishment candidates and
that this commitment ability originating in outsiders' extremism is the reason why outsider candidates can
obtain voters' support. This paper provides another reason why outsider candidates can commit to policies
preferred by voters: the incompetency that results from the inexperience of outsider candidates makes
them more accountable to voters than establishment candidates, who are experienced and are considered as
competent.
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competition. Most existing studies, using the standard Hotelling-Downs model where candi-
dates can commit to campaign promises, have investigated the eects of candidates' valence
on platform divergence in electoral competition. (Ansolabehere and Snyder 2000; Groseclose
2001; Aragones and Palfrey 2002; Kartik and McAfee 2007; Callander 2008; Carrillo and
Castanheira 2008; Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita 2009; Aragones and Xefteris 2017).
Among these studies, Aragones and Xefteris (2017) is similar to this paper in that voters'
evaluation about candidates' valence is their private information. However, in their envi-
ronment following the standard Hotelling-Downs model, voters cannot send any informative
signals to candidates.
In this literature, this paper is most closely related to Bernhardt et al. (2011), who
build a model with repeated elections where incumbent politicians, who cannot commit to
policies before being elected, face a tradeo between their own preferred policy and policy
compromise toward voters to get re-elected. Unlike this paper, they assume that voters
can observe politicians' valence only after they are elected,6 and show that incumbents
with valence advantage are more likely to deviate from their preferred policy for getting
re-elected.7
Finally, this paper is related to the literature focusing on the signaling function of voting
(Piketty 2000; Castanheira 2003; Razin 2003; Meirowitz 2005; Shotts 2006; Meirowitz and
Tucker 2007; Meirowitz and Shotts 2009; Hummel 2011; Kselman and Niou 2011; McMurray
2017; Myatt 2017).8 The models in these studies analyze the situation in which candi-
dates learn about voters' private information from electoral results. However, none of these
studies have analyzed how voters' private information aects the political accountability of
incumbent politicians.9
3 The model
3.1 Environment
Our model has two time periods (t = 1; 2), and all agents discount the future with a common
discount factor  2 (0; 1). A group of identical citizens has a majority and chooses a policy
maker in an election in each period. The elected politician chooses a policy et 2 f0; 1g, and
the majority prefer et = 1 to et = 0. They obtain v > 0 if et = 1 and obtain nothing if
et = 0.
As in Besley (2006), policy preferences divide electoral candidates into two types: con-
6Boleslavsky and Cotton (2015) also analyze the model where candidates cannot commit to policies before
elections and have private information about their valence characteristics.
7We will explain in more detail the dierence between this paper and Bernhard et al. (2011) after we
present our results (see Section 5.3).
8Callander and Wilkie (2007), Kartik and McAfee (2007), and Callander (2008) provide models in which
candidates send signals on their valence characteristics to voters.
9Among these studies, the motivation of this paper is related to the studies of protest voting by Kselman
and Niou (2011) and Myatt (2017). However, our model is based on the political agency model and its
structure is quite dierent from those of their models.
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gruent and dissonant types. The policy preferences of the dissonant type conict with the
majority. The dissonant type obtains private benet r > 0 by choosing et = 0, and obtains
nothing by choosing et = 1. The policy preferences of the congruent type coincide with the
majority, and this type always chooses et = 1. The type of a candidate is his or her private
information, and the prior probability that a candidate is the congruent type is  2 (0; 1).
This set-up encompasses many situations. One interpretation is that the policy prefer-
ences of dissonant politicians dier from those of the majority because the dissonant politi-
cians represent an organized minority group, such as the elite whose policy preferences
conict with the majority. In this interpretation, there is conict between the majority and
some minority groups of citizens over policies. The minority group attempts to inuence
policies by means such as lobbying and political donation, but only dissonant politicians
are receptive to the oer by the minority group. Another interpretation is that congruent
and dissonant types represent candidates' honesty. Honest politicians always prefer honest
behavior, but dishonest politicians who choose honest behavior incur loss from passing up
dishonest prot.
Competency is another dimension of candidates' heterogeneity. Electoral candidates
are either competent (i = H) or incompetent(i = L). Competent candidates can provide
voters with additional payos if elected. In the payo structure of the majority, this valence
component is additively separable from the payo from the policy choice et, which is the
standard formulation in the literature of candidates' valence and electoral competition (see,
among others, Ansolabehere and Snyder 2000, Groseclose 2001, and Aragones and Xefteris
2017). Voters can observe candidates' competency by observing their past experiences in
political oces, careers in the private sector, educational achievement, and so on. We assume
that candidates' types are not correlated with their competency; the prior probability of a
candidate being the congruent type is independent of the competency of the candidate.
There are two types of majority and these types are the majority's private information.
The majority have a subjective evaluation on how politicians' competency will increase their
payo, and the two types dier in this evaluation. When the majority is competency{oriented
(hereinafter called type-C), they give the highest priority to candidates' competency when
choosing a politician: the payo from competency is suciently high that the majority of
this type have lexicographic preferences over candidates. In this case, the majority always
prefer the competent candidate to the incompetent one. On the other hand, if the majority
assign more importance to candidates' expected policy choice, their voting decision will be
aected by candidates' expected policy choice. If this is the case, we say that the majority
is policy{oriented or type-P. The type-P majority obtain  > 0 from electing a competent
candidate. For notational simplicity, we dene v^  v=.
The type of the majority is determined by the nature. In the beginning of the rst
period, the nature chooses the type of the majority; the majority are type-C with probability
 2 (0; 1) and are type-P with probability 1  .
In the election in the rst period, a competent and an incompetent candidate run the
race, and the winner chooses a policy e1. In the second election, the incumbent politician
6
A competent and an incompetent 
candidate run for an election.
Nature draws the types.
The first election
Period 1 Period 2
Policy choice Entry of a challenger
The second election
Policy choice
Figure 1: The timing of events
contests with a challenger who is competent with probability q 2 (0; 1) and is incompetent
with probability 1   q. The elected candidates obtain W > 0 in both elections. Since the
model ends at the second period, the candidate elected in the second election can choose
his or her preferred policy without considering re-election. Hence, a dissonant candidate can
obtain R W + r by winning the second election. We assume that R > r.10
We assume that the majority re-elect the incumbent if the incumbent is identical with
the challenger in terms of both the perceived probability of being congruent and the level of
competency. We also assume that all agents do not play weakly dominated strategies.
The timing of events is as follows (See Figure 1).
1. A competent and an incompetent candidate run for election. The nature chooses the
type of each candidate (congruent or dissonant) and the type of the majority (type-C
or type-P).
2. The majority choose between the competent and incompetent candidates.
3. The elected politician chooses e1 2 f0; 1g, and the period 1 ends.
4. A challenger in the second election is drawn, and the nature determines the type of
the challenger.
5. Considering the observed policy choice e1 by the incumbent, the majority choose be-
tween the incumbent and the challenger (second election).
6. The elected politician chooses e2 2 f0; 1g.
Note that the majority always vote for the competent candidate if the game ends at
period 1. This is because choosing the competent candidate increases the majority's payo
by at least  > 0, and the probability of the competent candidate being congruent is the
same as that of the incompetent candidate. Therefore, there is no reason to choose the
incompetent candidate in such a case.
10If this assumption does not hold, the dissonant type always chooses e1 = 0.
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The re-election motive resulting from the second election can provide dissonant politicians
with an incentive to choose a policy preferred by the majority, and this incentive will be
dierent between competent and incompetent politicians. Since the majority can observe
the action of the incumbent politician before the second election, the policy choice in the
rst period can be a signal about the type of the incumbent. Moreover, the result in the rst
election can also transmit information on the type of the majority to the incumbent politician,
which makes the politician's policy choice depend on the majority's voting strategy.
Our interest is whether there exists an equilibrium where the incompetent candidate
beats the competent one in the rst election where the two candidates dier only in the
competency levels from the voters' perspective.
4 Equilibrium
4.1 Second election
As mentioned above, the politician in oce in the second period will choose his or her
most preferred policy because the politician does not need to seek re-election. Hence, the
congruent type chooses e2 = 1, and the dissonant type chooses e2 = 0. Therefore, the
majority prefer the congruent type to the dissonant one if there is no dierence in the
candidates' competency.
Although the types of candidates are unobservable by voters, the policy choice in the
rst period may provide information about the type of the incumbent. Since the congruent
politician always chooses e1 = 1, the majority can identify the incumbent as the dissonant
type if the incumbent has chosen e1 = 0.
11
If the incumbent has chosen e1 = 1 in the rst period, the majority update their belief
about the type of the incumbent by the following rule. Let i denote the probability that
the dissonant-type incumbent with competency level i 2 fH;Lg chooses e1 = 1. Then, the
majority perceive that the incumbent who has chosen e1 = 1 is the congruent type with the
following probability:
i =

+ (1  )i ; i = H;L: (1)
Note that i   with strict inequality when i < 1. On the type of the challenger, the
majority have no additional information and perceive that he or she is the congruent type
with probability .
The choice of the majority in the second election depends on (i) the competency levels of
the incumbent and the challenger, (ii) the policy choice by the incumbent in the rst period,
11If the dissonant type chooses e1 = 0 with positive probability, this belief of the majority is consistent
with Bayes' rule and the incumbent's strategy. When the dissonant type does not choose e1 = 0, the
information set following e1 = 0 is o-the-equilibrium-path. In this case, we assume that the majority's
belief in this information set places zero probability on the congruent type. This restriction will be minimal,
given the formulation that the congruent type never chooses e1 = 0. Besley and Smart (2007) make a similar
assumption.
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and (iii) the type of the majority. The incumbent who has chosen e1 = 1 is not less likely to
be the congruent type than the challenger, and the incumbent who has chosen e1 = 0 is the
dissonant type with probability one. Hence, we have the following results.12
Remark 1. Regardless of the type of the majority, the majority re-elect the competent in-
cumbent who has chosen e1 = 1 and replace the incompetent incumbent who has chosen
e1 = 0.
In the case where the competent incumbent has chosen e1 = 0, the majority perceive that
the incumbent is certainly the dissonant type and face the tradeo between competency and
congruence. In this case, the incumbent cannot get re-elected if a competent challenger
enters the second election. If the challenger is incompetent, the electoral result depends on
the type of the majority. The type-C majority always prefer the competent incumbent to
the incompetent challenger; hence, the competent incumbent can retain political power even
if he or she has chosen e1 = 0. When the majority is type-P, they re-elect the incumbent if
and only if
  v: (2)
The left-hand side is the majority's payo from electing the competent but dissonant in-
cumbent, and the right-hand side is their payo from electing the incompetent challenger.
Although the incumbent is the dissonant type, the majority obtain  from his or her com-
petency. On the other hand, the challenger is incompetent but is the congruent type with
probability . To focus on the interesting case where the type of the majority matters for
the electoral result, we assume the following.
Assumption 1. We assume that the policy-oriented (type-P) majority prefer the incompe-
tent challenger to the incumbent who is competent but is certainly dissonant:
v > :
Then, we obtain the following.
Remark 2. Under Assumption 1, the survival of the competent incumbent who has chosen
e1 = 0 is as follows.
 If the challenger is incompetent and the majority is competency-oriented (type-C), the
incumbent is re-elected at the second election.
 If the challenger is competent or the majority is policy-oriented (type-P), the incumbent
loses at the second election.
In the case where the incompetent incumbent has chosen e1 = 1, the incumbent is more
likely to be congruent than the challenger since L  . Therefore, the majority prefer the
12Remember that the majority re-elect the incumbent if there is no dierence between the incumbent and
the challenger in the perceived probability of being congruent and the level of competency.
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Case (i): Competent incumbent
1
0
Case (ii): Incompetent incumbent
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Figure 2: Re-election probability of the incumbent
incumbent to the incompetent challenger. When the majority are type-C, they prefer the
competent challenger to the incumbent. When the majority are type-P and the challenger
is competent, the majority re-elect the incumbent if and only if
Lv  + v: (3)
The majority obtain Lv by re-electing the incumbent and obtain  + v by electing the
challenger. Let  denote the probability that the type-P majority re-elect the incompetent
incumbent who has chosen e1 = 1 in the election where the challenger is competent. Then,
from (1) and (3),  can be written as
 (L)
8><>:
= 1 if L <

1 
(1 )v 
1+v ;
2 [0; 1] if L = 1  (1 )v 1+v ;
= 0 if L >

1 
(1 )v 
1+v :
(4)
Note that  is non-increasing in L. This is because a higher level of L lowers the posterior
probability that the incompetent incumbent who has chosen e1 = 1 will be the congruent type
(see (1)), thereby increasing the majority's incentive to vote for the competent challenger.
Note that the majority replace the incompetent incumbent if L = 1 because L =  in this
case.
Summarizing the above argument, we obtain the following remark. Furthermore, Figure
2 summarizes the re-election probability of the incumbent.
Remark 3. The survival of the incompetent incumbent who has chosen e1 = 1 is as follows.
 If the challenger is incompetent, the majority re-elect the incumbent.
 If the challenger is competent and the majority are competency-oriented (type-C), the
majority elect the challenger.
 If the challenger is competent and the majority are policy-oriented (type-P), the ma-
jority re-elect the incumbent with probability  .
For the later analysis, we derive the continuation value for the type-P majority at the
end of the rst period. It depends on the competency of the incumbent and his or her policy
10
choice e1. When the majority is type-P and the incumbent is competent, the majority's
expected payo in the second period is given by
~VH(e1) =
(
+ Hv if e1 = 1
q+ v if e1 = 0
(5)
If the incumbent has chosen e1 = 1, the type-P majority re-elect the incumbent. Then, they
obtain the value of competency  and receive v with probability H . If the incumbent has
chosen e1 = 0, the type-P majority replace the incumbent with the challenger who will be
competent with probability q and will be the congruent type with probability .
Similarly, when the majority is type-P and the incumbent is incompetent, the majority's
expected payo in the second period is given by
~VL(e1) =
(
qmaxf+ v; Lvg+ (1  q)Lv if e1 = 1
q+ v if e1 = 0
(6)
In the case where the incumbent has chosen e1 = 1 and the challenger is competent, whether
the type-P majority re-elect the incumbent depends on the magnitude relationship between
Lv and + v.
4.2 The choice of the incumbent
Next, we consider the choice of the incumbent in the rst period. While the congruent type
always chooses e1 = 1, the dissonant type faces tradeo between his or her preferred policy
e1 = 0 and the chance of re-election.
4.2.1 The belief of the incumbent
Although the incumbent cannot observe the type of the majority, the result of the rst
election provides information about it. Let i denote the posterior probability that the
majority are type-C when the candidate with competency level i 2 fH;Lg has won the rst
election.
When the competent candidate has won the rst election, the posterior probability that
the majority are type-C is given by
H =

 + (1  ) ; (7)
where  2 [0; 1] denotes the probability that the type-P majority choose the competent
candidate in the rst election. Equation (7) shows that the voting behavior of the majority
in the rst period aects the belief of the incumbent politician.
We say that the majority use a pooling strategy if, regardless of their type, they always
choose the competent candidate in the rst election. In this case,  = 1, and H takes the
minimum value of .
On the other hand, we say that the majority use a separating strategy if the type-P
majority choose the incompetent candidate in the rst election. In this case,  = 0, and
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the incumbent can identify the type of the majority in the rst period. Then, H takes the
maximum value of one.
When the incompetent candidate wins the rst election, we assume that he or she can
identify the majority as type-P because the type-C majority never elect the incompetent
candidate. Thus, the posterior belief held by the incompetent incumbent is given by
L = 0: (8)
4.2.2 Competent dissonant incumbent
Here, we consider the behavior of the competent dissonant incumbent. Choosing e1 = 1, this
incumbent can certainly obtain re-election payo R. Choosing e1 = 0, he or she can obtain
payo r, but faces uncertainty about re-election. As Remark 2 shows, re-election occurs when
the challenger is incompetent and the majority assign the highest priority to candidates'
competency (i.e., their type is type-C). Hence, the perceived re-election probability is (1  
q)H . Then, the competent dissonant incumbent chooses e1 = 1 if and only if
13
R  r + (1  q)HR: (9)
Let H  1 (1 q)H denote the increase in the re-election probability by choosing e1 = 1.
Then, condition (9) can be written as
HR  r: (10)
The left-hand side of (10) is the gain of choosing e1 = 1 for the competent dissonant
incumbent, which comes from the increase in the re-election probability, while the right-hand
side is the opportunity cost of choosing e1 = 1. Condition (10) shows that the competent
dissonant incumbent is more likely to choose e1 = 1 when he or she believes that the majority
are more likely to be type-P (H is low). Since the type-P majority replace the competent
incumbent who is exposed as dissonant, the competent incumbent has a large incentive to
pretend to be congruent in such a situation. On the other hand, since the type-C majority
re-elect the competent incumbent regardless of his or her policy choice if the challenger
is incompetent, the competent incumbent who believes that the majority is type-C has a
large incentive to pursue his or her own interest. Therefore, a low value of H enhances the
electoral accountability of the competent dissonant incumbent.
Moreover, the competent dissonant incumbent is more likely to choose e1 = 1 when q is
large. While the competent dissonant incumbent who has chosen e1 = 0 has some chance of
being re-elected if the challenger is incompetent, this chance disappears if the challenger is
competent. Hence, choosing e1 = 1 increases the re-election probability more greatly when
the challenger is more likely to be competent. Therefore, the competent dissonant incumbent
has a large incentive to act in the majority's interest when the challenger is more likely to
be competent.
13we assume that the competent dissonant incumbent prefers e1 = 1 if he or she is indierent between
e1 = 0 and e1 = 1.
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As we discussed above, the posterior belief H takes the minimum value  when the
majority use the pooling strategy ( = 1). If the probability q is small enough and satises
q <
r   (1  )R
R
 q
H
; (11)
then condition (10) does not hold even if H is the minimum value . Hence the competent
dissonant incumbent always chooses e1 = 0 (H = 0) in this case. On the other hand, if
q  q
H
, the competent dissonant incumbent chooses e1 = 1 if the majority use the pooling
strategy.
The posterior belief H takes the maximum value of one when the majority use the
separating strategy ( = 0). If the probability q is large enough and satises
q  r
R
 qH ; (12)
then condition (10) holds even if H takes the maximum value. In this case, the competent
dissonant incumbent always chooses e1 = 1 (H = 1). On the other hand, if q < qH , the
competent dissonant incumbent chooses e1 = 0 if the majority use the separating strategy.
Note that qH > qH because R > r and  < 1.
The following lemma summarizes the above results.
Lemma 1. Let Assumption 1 hold. Then, the competent dissonant incumbent is more likely
to choose e1 = 1 when he or she believes that the majority are more likely to be policy-oriented
(H is small) and the challenger is more likely to be competent (q is large).
 When q is suciently small and satises q < q
H
, the competent dissonant incumbent
always chooses e1 = 0, i.e., H = 0.
 When q is suciently large and satises q  qH , the competent dissonant incumbent
always chooses e1 = 1, i.e., H = 1.
 When q satises q 2 [q
H
; qH), the equilibrium policy choice by the competent dissonant
incumbent depends on the voting strategy of the majority. If the majority use the
pooling strategy ( = 1), then the competent dissonant incumbent chooses e1 = 1,
i.e., H = 1. If the majority use the separating strategy ( = 0), then the competent
dissonant incumbent chooses e1 = 0, i.e., H = 0.
4.2.3 Incompetent dissonant incumbent
Next, we consider the behavior of the incompetent dissonant incumbent. If this incumbent
chooses e1 = 0, his or her payo is zero because the majority elect the challenger in the
second election. Choosing e1 = 1, this incumbent has a chance to get re-elected. As Remark
3 shows, re-election certainly occurs when the challenger is incompetent. When the challenger
is competent, re-election occurs with probability  if the majority are type-P, and re-election
never occurs if the majority are type-C. Hence, the perceived re-election probability is q(1 
L) + (1  q)  L. Then, the incompetent dissonant incumbent chooses e1 = 1 if
LR > r: (13)
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Condition (13) shows that if  > 0, the incompetent dissonant incumbent is more likely
to choose e1 = 1 when he or she believes that the majority are more likely to be type-P. While
the type-C majority always prefer the competent challenger to the incompetent incumbent
regardless of the incumbent's policy choice, the type-P majority prefer the incompetent
incumbent to the competent challenger with some probability if the incumbent has acted in
the majority's interest in the rst period. Thus, the belief that the majority are more likely
to be type-P enhances the incentive to choose e1 = 1.
Contrary to the case of the competent dissonant incumbent, the incompetent dissonant
incumbent is more likely to choose e1 = 1 when q is small. While the incompetent dissonant
incumbent who has chosen e1 = 1 can certainly get re-elected if the challenger is incompetent,
the re-election is uncertain if the challenger is competent. Hence, choosing e1 = 1 increases
the re-election probability more greatly when the challenger is more likely to be incompetent.
Therefore, the incompetent dissonant incumbent has a large incentive to act in the majority's
interest when the challenger is more likely to be incompetent.
From condition (13), the probability that the incompetent dissonant incumbent chooses
e1 = 1 can be written as
L( )
8>>><>>>:
= 1 if  > 1q(1 L)

r
R   (1  q)

;
2 [0; 1] if  = 1q(1 L)

r
R   (1  q)

;
= 0 if  < 1q(1 L)

r
R   (1  q)

:
(14)
Naturally, the incompetent dissonant incumbent is more likely to choose e1 = 1 if the type-P
majority are more likely to reward high policy performance by re-election (i.e.,  is high).
From (4) and (14), we can derive the equilibrium values of L and  as follows.
Lemma 2. Dene q
L
and qL as
q
L
 R  r
R
qL  R  r
R
: (15)
Then, the equilibrium values of L and  are as follows.
 In the case of v^ > 1=(1  )
{ If q is suciently small and satises q  q
L
, then L = 1 and  = 0.
{ If q 2 (q
L
; qL), then L =  2 (0; 1) and  =  2 (0; 1), where
  
1  
(1  )v   
+ v
;   r   (1  q)R
(1  )qR : (16)
{ If q is suciently large and satises q  qL, then L = 0 and  = 1.
 In the case of v^  1=(1  )
{ If q  q
L
, then L = 1 and  = 0.
{ If q > q
L
, then L =  = 0.
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Figure 3: The relationship between  and L.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Figure 3 describes the graphs of the reaction functions L( ) and  (L) in the case of
v^ > 1=(1   ) and q 2 (q
L
; qL). The equilibrium values of L and  are represented by
the intersection of the two graphs. Lemma 2 states that L is non-increasing in q in the
equilibrium, which is natural as the incompetent dissonant incumbent has a larger incentive
to choose e1 = 1 when the challenger is less likely to be competent.
The policy choice is dierent between competent and incompetent incumbents, and this is
because of the assumption that voters cannot commit to re-election strategies. If the majority
could commit to punish the incumbent after e1 = 0 and to reward him or her after e1 = 1,
both the competent and incompetent incumbents would face the same decision problem.
However, the majority cannot commit to who to vote for, and the electoral advantage or
disadvantage resulting from competency aects the electoral benet of choosing e1 = 1.
Thus, the incumbent's incentive to act in the majority's interest depends on his or her
competency.
4.3 The rst election
Finally, we consider the choice of the majority in the rst election. When the majority
is type-C, they always vote for the competent candidate. The type-P majority weigh the
candidate's competency against the expected policy choice to decide who to vote for.
By electing the competent candidate, who will choose the policy e1 = 1 with probability
+ (1  )H , the type-P majority obtain
VH(H)  + [+ (1  )H ](v +  ~VH(1)) + [(1  )(1  H)] ~VH(0); (17)
where ~VH(e1) (e1 2 f0; 1g) comes from (5). Similarly, by electing the incompetent candidate,
who will choose the policy e1 = 1 with probability +(1 )L, the type-P majority obtain
VL(L)  [+ (1  )L](v +  ~VL(1)) + [(1  )(1  L)] ~VL(0); (18)
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where ~VL(e1) comes from (6). The type-P majority choose the competent candidate in the
rst election if and only if VH(H)  VL(L).14
Lemma 3. The expected payos of the type-P majority, VH(H) and VL(L), satisfy the
following properties:
1. Vi(i) is increasing in i (i = H;L).
2. VH(H) > VL(L) if H = L.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 3 states that the expected payo for the type-P majority from electing the candi-
date with competency level i increases in the probability that this elected candidate chooses
e1 = 1. Lemma 3 also states that the type-P majority prefer the competent candidate if
the competent and incompetent candidates choose e1 = 1 with the same probability. Hence,
for the incompetent candidate to win, it is necessary that L must be greater than H : the
incompetent candidate wins the rst election only if the majority face the tradeo between
the candidates' competency and their representation. However, the existence of this tradeo
is insucient for the type-P majority to vote for the incompetent candidate. In addition,
for the separating equilibrium to exist, the type-P majority must place a premium on the
policy choice: their policy payo (v) from e1 = 1 must be suciently large, compared with
their benet from having a competent politician ().
Let us consider the case where the dissonant competent politician never chooses e1 = 1
(i.e., H = 0). The following lemma shows when it is optimal for the type-P majority to
elect the incompetent candidate in this situation.
Lemma 4. The relationship among VH(0), VL(), and VL(1) is given as follows.
1. If the policy payo v is suciently small compared with the benet of competency 
and the condition v^  v(q) holds, then VH(0)  VL(1), where
v(q)  1 + (1  q)
(1  )(1  ) : (19)
2. If v^ is in (v(q); v(q)], then VL()  VH(0) < VL(1), where
v(q) =
[2 + q(1  )] +p2[2 + q(1  )]2 + 4(1  )(1  )[1 + (1  q)]
2(1  )(1  ) :
(20)
3. If v^ is suciently large and satises v^ > v(q), then VL() > VH(0).
Proof. See the Appendix.
14We assume that the type-P majority elect the competent candidate if they are indierent between
choosing competent and incompetent candidates.
16
Lemma 4 states that the majority vote for the competent candidate regardless of his or
her expected policy choice when the policy payo v is suciently small. However, when the
policy payo v is suciently large and the competent candidate is expected to choose e1 = 0
after winning, the type-P majority vote for the incompetent candidate if this candidate will
choose e1 = 1 with suciently high probability.
4.4 Equilibrium
We focus on the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which the majority in the rst period
use a pure strategy (i.e.,  is either 1 or 0). Hence, two types of equilibria are possible:
the pooling equilibrium in which the majority always vote for the competent candidate in
the rst election, and the separating equilibrium in which the type-C majority vote for the
competent candidate while the type-P majority vote for the incompetent candidate.
Let us consider the case of v^  v(q), which is the situation where the type-P majority's
payo of having a competent politician  dominates the policy payo v. In this case, the
condition VH(H)  VL(L) holds for any H and L (from Lemma 4). Therefore, the type-
P majority prefer the competent candidate in the rst election, and the unique equilibrium
is a pooling one.
Next, we consider the case of q  q  minfqH ; qLg. In this case, the probability that
the future challenger is competent is high, and this situation enhances the accountability
of the competent dissonant incumbent but undermines that of the incompetent dissonant
incumbent.15 Specically, in this case, at least either H = 1 or L = 0 holds, because
H = 1 if q  qH from Lemma 1 and L = 0 if q  qL from Lemma 2. Since the competent
candidate is more accountable than the incompetent one (H  L), the type-P majority
prefer the competent candidate in the rst election (from Lemma 3). Hence, the pooling
equilibrium is the unique equilibrium in this case.
The following proposition summarizes the above results.
Proposition 1. Let Assumption 1 hold. Then, there is a unique equilibrium in which the
majority use the pooling strategy if either of the following conditions holds:
1. The policy payo v is small, compared with the benet of competency , enough to
satisfy v^  v(q).
2. The probability that a competent challenger runs in the second election, q, is large
enough to satisfy q  q = minfqH ; qLg.
Next, we consider the more complicated cases that satisfy v^ > v(q) and q < q. The
rst condition v^ > v(q) means that the policy payo v is not too small, compared with
the payo from competency . Under this condition, VL(1) > VH(0) holds from Lemma 4,
and hence, the type-P majority would vote for the incompetent candidate if the political
15Recall that when the challenger is more likely to be competent, the competent dissonant incumbent has
a larger incentive to choose e1 = 1, while the incompetent dissonant incumbent has a smaller incentive to
choose e1 = 1.
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accountability of the incompetent incumbent (L) is suciently greater than that of the
competent incumbent (H). The second condition q < q yields the tradeo between the can-
didates' competency and their representation of the majority's political preferences. Under
this condition, the incompetent incumbent chooses e1 = 1 with probability L   2 (0; 1),
while the competent incumbent chooses e1 = 0 if the incumbent believes that the majority
is type-C (H = 1) or the challenger is likely to be incompetent (q < qH).
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For the separating strategy to be optimal for the majority, L and v^ must be suciently
large, and H must be suciently small. Since L is decreasing in q and H is increasing
in q, the type-P majority will vote for the incompetent candidate if q is suciently small.
When v^ is suciently large, the separating equilibrium exists because the type-P majority
highly evaluate the incompetent candidate's better representation of their preferences. When
q is greater than q
H
, the majority's voting strategy aects H through the change in the
incumbent's belief about the type of the majority. Hence, multiple equilibria can arise in this
case. The following proposition shows the conditions under which the separating equilibrium
exists.
Proposition 2. Let Assumption 1 hold. Moreover, we assume that q < q and v > v(q).
1. In the case of v  v(q), the following hold.
(a) If q > q
L
, then there is a unique pooling equilibrium.
(b) If q  q
L
, then a separating equilibrium exists.
(c) If q
H
 q  q
L
, then both types of equilibria exist.
2. In the case of v^ > v(q), the following hold.
(a) The separating equilibrium always exists.
(b) If q  q
H
, then the pooling equilibrium also exists.
Proof. See the Appendix
Figure 4 describes the parameter spaces in which each type of equilibrium exists, where
panels (a) and (b) correspond to the cases of q
H
< q
L
< q and q
L
< q
H
< q, respectively.17
The vertical axes describe the range of v^ > 1=(1  ).18
Let us consider the case of v(q) < v  v(q), in which the policy payo v takes an inter-
mediate value. In this case, from Lemma 4, the type-P majority vote for the incompetent
candidate if they are certain that the incompetent incumbent chooses e1 = 1 and the com-
petent incumbent chooses e1 = 0 (i.e., L = 1 and H = 0), and vote for the competent
16Note that v^ > v(q) implies v^ > 1=(1  ), which assures  2 (0; 1).
17If  equals to one, then q
H
coincides with qH and qL coincides with qL. As  decreases, qH decreases
from qH while qL increases from qL. When r is suciently large, the relation qL < qH holds. In this
case, depending on the value of , the following relations are possible: (i) q
L
< qL < qH < qH , (ii)
q
L
< q
H
< qL < qH , and (iii) qH < qL < qH < qL. When r is suciently small, the relation qH < qL
holds. In this case, the possible relation among the four thresholds is q
H
< qH < qL < qL.
18Note that v(q) > 1=(1  ).
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candidate if L = . When the future challenger is suciently likely to be competent,
specically if q > q
L
holds, then the incompetent dissonant incumbent chooses L   (see
Lemma 2), and hence, the pooling equilibrium uniquely exists. When q  q
L
and q < q
H
,
L = 1 and H = 0, and hence, the separating equilibrium uniquely exists. When q  qH ,
the policy choice of the competent dissonant incumbent depends on his or her posterior
belief about the type of the majority, and this belief must be consistent with the majority's
voting strategy. If the majority use the pooling strategy, then the electoral result conveys
no information about the type of the majority, and the posterior belief is equal to the prior
belief. Then, the competent dissonant incumbent chooses e1 = 1 (H = 1), which makes the
pooling strategy optimal for the majority. If the majority use the separating strategy, the
competent dissonant incumbent perceives that the majority is certainly type-C and chooses
e1 = 0 (H = 0), which makes the separating strategy optimal if L = 1 (q  qL). Hence,
when q
H
 q  q
L
, both types of equilibria exist.
In the case of v^ > v(q) where the policy payo v is extremely high compared with the
payo from competency , from Lemma 4, the type-P majority vote for the incompetent
incumbent if L   (this is satised under q < q) and H = 0. If q < qH , then the
competent dissonant incumbent chooses H = 0, and the separating equilibrium uniquely
exists in this case. If q  q
H
, as explained above, then the policy choice of the competent
incumbent H depends on the majority's voting strategy; H = 0 when the majority use the
separating strategy, and H = 1 when the majority use the pooling strategy. Hence, both
types of equilibria exist in this case.
Summarizing,
 The policy-oriented majority elect the incompetent candidate when
{ the majority place sucient priority on the candidates' expected policy choice,
compared with their competency (v^ is suciently large), and
{ the probability that the incompetent dissonant incumbent chooses the majority's
preferred policy is suciently large, compared with that of the competent disso-
nant incumbent (L is suciently greater than H).
 H increases with q (the probability of the challenger being competent), while L
decreases with q.
 The incumbent's policy choice also depends on his or her posterior belief about the
type of the majority, and the majority's voting strategy aects it. Due to this relation,
multiple equilibria can arise.
 When the majority use the separating strategy, the electoral result reveals the type
of the majority. The competent candidate ’s victory reveals that the majority is
competency-oriented. As a result, under an appropriate set of parameter values, the
competent incumbent never makes policy compromise to the majority, and this policy
choice in turn makes the majority's separating strategy optimal.
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Figure 4: Equilibrium
4.5 On the signaling role of voting
The signaling mechanism in voting explained above means that the expectation of the type-P
majority that the competent politician may not represent their interests can be a self-fullling
prophecy. Let us suppose that the type-P majority vote for the incompetent candidate in the
rst election fearing that the competent politician would not adopt their preferred policy.
Then, if the competent politician is elected in the rst election, he or she perceives that
the majority is competency-oriented. Since this belief undermines the accountability of the
competent politician, the fear of the policy-oriented majority is eventually realized.
This self-fullling feature as a result of voters' signaling makes the victory of the incom-
petent candidate more likely. Let us consider the case of q
H
 q < q. As described in
Figure 4, multiple equilibria arise in this case if v is suciently large, but the existence of
the separating equilibrium depends on the signaling mechanism. To see the role of signaling,
we assume that the competent incumbent's belief H is xed at the prior . Then, from
(11), the competent dissonant incumbent will choose e1 = 1 if and only if q  qH . Hence,
in the case of q
H
 q < q, the separating equilibrium cannot exist if the election does not
convey any information about the type of the majority.
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5 Empirical predictions and implications
5.1 Policy conict
The incompetent candidate is elected when the policy payo v is suciently large, compared
with the type-P majority's payo from having a competent politician (). While the majority
obtain the payo  if the politician is competent regardless of his or her policy choice, they
enjoy the policy payo v only if their preferred policy is chosen. Hence, when v^ = v= is
large, the majority place priority on the politicians' choice rather than their competency.
Then, in what situation does v^ become large in real world societies?
A sharp policy conict between the majority and other citizens (e.g., the rich) increases
the importance of policy choice and causes the situation where v^ is large. When policy
conict is large, the majority's payo varies greatly depending on whether their preferred
policy is chosen or not. Policy conicts are caused by, for instance, economic changes that
produce disparity between economic winners and losers. Economic losers will require the
government to change the status quo, but economic winners will not.
Prediction 1. When policy conict becomes more severe, the majority are more likely to
elect a less competent candidate.
Due to the recent progress of globalization, controversial topics such as immigration and
trade policy are becoming major political issues. In the United States, imports from China
have dramatically increased since the 1990s, and this new trade has increased unemployment
and decreased wages in regions with import-competing manufacturing industries (Autor et
al. 2013). Autor et al. (2017) show that the growing imports from China contribute to the
ideological polarization in Congress.
Our model suggests that these factors may be the reasons why U.S. voters have consis-
tently elected less-experienced candidates in presidential elections since 1996. Conict of
interests caused by these factors has possibly made voters put candidates' expected policy
choice before their credentials. In particular, Donald Trump's win in the 2016 election was
largely attributable to the support from those who felt dissatised with the rise of global
competition and the inux of immigrants. Trump's campaign pledges favoring protectionism
may be one of the causes of support from these citizens.
5.2 Quality of the challenger
The expected level of the challenger's competency aects the behavior of the incumbent, but
this eect is dierent between competent and incompetent politicians. The expectation that
a competent challenger is likely to run for the future election is positively associated with the
accountability of a competent politician, but its association is negative for an incompetent
politician.
As a result, the expected quality of the challenger aects the majority's choice between
competent and incompetent candidates. The majority is more likely to choose the incompe-
tent candidate when the future challenger is more likely to be incompetent.
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Prediction 2. The probability that a competent challenger will run for the future elec-
tion enhances the accountability of competent politicians but undermines that of incompetent
politicians. As a result, incompetent candidates are more likely to win against competent
candidates when the future challenger is more likely to be incompetent.
5.3 Value of holding oce
As in standard political agency models, our model also predicts that an increase in the re-
ward for holding oce (R) aects the voters' welfare through both \incentive and selection
eects." While an increase in the reward enhances the incentive of the dissonant-type in-
cumbent to choose the majority's preferred policy (incentive eect), this eort of pretending
to be the congruent type undermines the precision of the voters' information obtained from
the incumbent's policy choice. Hence, the incentive eect is harmful for the selection of
congruent-type politicians: the dissonant politician is re-elected with high probability when
the reward for holding oce is large (selection eect).
Moving forward from standard models, our model yields a prediction on the eect of the
politicians' reward on the voters' preference for the candidates' competency. If the reward
for the politician is large enough, the majority prefer the competent candidate to the incom-
petent one in the rst election. Large rewards make the dissonant-type politician choose the
majority's preferred policy in the rst period, regardless of his or her competency level. This
incentive eect eliminates the behavioral dierence between competent and incompetent
politicians, and hence, the majority vote for the competent candidate.
Prediction 3. When the reward for the politician is large enough, competent candidates win
against incompetent candidates.
This result is complementary to the existing theoretical literature that analyzes the eects
of reward for politicians on their quality, focusing on citizens' entry decisions into the political
sector (Caselli and Morelli 2004; Messner and Polborn 2004; Mattozzi and Merlo 2008).
In these models, competent politicians can provide better public service but have higher
opportunity costs of running for elections. Higher rewards change the balance between the
benet and opportunity costs of being a politician, but whether those attract competent
individuals into the political sector depends on the models. While Caselli and Morelli (2004)
predict that a higher reward increases the average quality of politicians, Messner and Polborn
(2004) and Mattozzi and Merlo (2008) predict the opposite eect.
Existing empirical studies show that higher rewards for politicians attract more compe-
tent candidates and improve the quality of the elected politician (Ferraz and Finan 2011a,
Kotakorpi and Poutvaara 2011, Gagliarducci and Nannicini 2013). However, to the best
of our knowledge, no empirical research has examined our prediction that high rewards for
politicians cause voters' preference for competent candidates.
22
5.4 Valence and political representation
Finally, we discuss the model's prediction on how the competency of elected politicians re-
lates with their representation of voters' preferences. Since both the competency of elected
politicians and their policy choice are endogenously determined in the model, we cannot use
comparative statics. To predict the \ceteris paribus" relation between competency and po-
litical representation, we alternatively compare the behavior of competent and incompetent
politicians xing all parameters. Since the incompetent candidate can be elected only in
the separating equilibrium, we focus on the region of the parameters where the separating
equilibrium exists.
5.4.1 Political accountability
First, we consider the relation between competency and political accountability. We dene
political accountability as the degree to which the re-election motive can discipline the policy
choice of the incumbent. We can measure it by the probability that the dissonant incumbent
will choose the majority's preferred policy in the rst period.
In the rst period of the separating equilibrium, the majority's preferred policy is more
likely to be chosen by the incompetent incumbent than by the competent incumbent. For
the incompetent incumbent, who has the disadvantage of competency, to get re-elected, it is
necessary to choose the majority's preferred policy in his or her rst term. When the param-
eters lie in the region where the separating equilibrium is possible, choosing the majority's
preferred policy suciently enhances the re-election probability. As a result, the re-election
motive disciplines the incompetent dissonant incumbent, and the majority's preferred policy
is realized with positive probability. On the other hand, the competent dissonant incum-
bent never chooses the majority's preferred policy in the separating equilibrium. This is
because the competent incumbent elected in the rst election perceives that the majority is
competency-oriented and his or her advantage of competency will dominate the next election.
Hence, the re-election motive cannot make the competent dissonant incumbent accountable.
If the parameters lie in the region where multiple equilibria are possible, the relation
between competency and accountability is more ambiguous. When the majority use the
pooling strategy, the competent incumbent cannot identify the majority's type. Hence, in
contrast to the separating equilibrium, the competent dissonant incumbent certainly chooses
the majority's preferred policy in the rst period of the pooling equilibrium. As a result, if
q > q
L
, then the competent incumbent in the pooling equilibrium is more likely to choose
the majority's preferred policy in the rst period than the incompetent incumbent in the
separating equilibrium.
Prediction 4. The relation between the incumbent's competency and his or her political
accountability is as follows.
1. When the pair of parameters (q; v^) lie in the region where a unique separating equi-
librium exists, the incompetent incumbent is more accountable than the competent in-
cumbent.
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2. When the pair of parameters (q; v^) lie in the region of multiple equilibria, the incom-
petent incumbent is more accountable than the competent incumbent in the separating
equilibrium, but is less accountable than the competent incumbent in the pooling equi-
librium.
The rst statement in Prediction 4 is consistent with the hypothesis, called as the
\marginality hypothesis" in the literature, that elected politicians who have won an elec-
tion with a small margin (i.e., electorally weak politicians) will compromise more greatly to
voters, compared with electorally strong ones.19
Contrary to this hypothesis, existing theories predict that electoral advantage makes
politicians choose a policy close to voters' preferences (Ansolabehere and Snyder 2000; Grose-
close 2001; Aragones and Palfrey 2002). The models of these studies assume that candidates
announce their policy platforms before an election and can commit to them. The valence
advantage makes politicians choose policies close to the median's ideal point because the
advantages become of increasing importance when the policy platforms among candidates
converge. However, this mechanism does not work in our model since we assume that can-
didates cannot commit to policies before elections.
Bernhardt et al. (2011) provide a dynamic election model in which candidates cannot
commit to policies before elections. In contrast to our model where the candidates' valence
can be observed by the voters before elections, they consider the environment where voters
can observe politicians' valence only after they are elected. They show that elected politicians
with higher valence are more likely to compromise to voters but can win re-election with
small compromise. In contrast to their results, our model shows the possibility that elected
politicians with higher valence are less likely to compromise in their rst term.20
Empirical ndings on the relationship between political representation and valence advan-
tage is mixed. Ansolabehere et al. (2001) show that incumbent politicians, who generally
enjoy advantage, are more likely to choose moderate policies than challenger candidates.
Stone and Simas (2010) show that the ideological distance between incumbents and their
district's median opinion decreases with the competency levels of incumbents. On the other
hand, Grin (2006) nds evidence supporting the marginality hypothesis that legislatures
elected from more competitive districts (i.e., electorally weak legislatures) behave in line
with their constituencies' preferences.21
19This hypothesis was initially proposed by MacRae (1952), according to Fiorina (1973).
20While politicians can be elected at most twice, like U.S. presidents, in our model, Bernhardt et al.
(2011) analyze the environment where politicians can be elected more than twice and show that the relation
between valence advantage and policy extremeness changes with politicians' seniority: valence advantage
and policy extremeness are positively related among re-elected politicians because high-valence politicians
can get re-elected with small compromise.
21As Bernhardt et al. (2011) suggest, this mixed evidence may be attributable to the fact that the relation
between valence and political representation is dierent between rst-term and senior politicians.
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5.4.2 Term-limit eects
In the standard political agency model, incumbent politicians choose their preferred policy
when they face binding term limits. Hence, whether term limits bind or not aects politicians'
performance.
The above argument implies that this eect of term limits can be dierent between
competent and incompetent incumbents. In the separating equilibrium, the eect of binding
term limits on policy performance is observed only when the incumbent is incompetent. In
the rst period, the incompetent incumbent chooses e1 = 1 with probability + (1  )L,
where L   2 (0; 1). In the second period, the re-elected incompetent incumbent chooses
e2 = 1 with probability =( + (1   )L). Hence, the binding term limit decreases the
probability that e = 1 is implemented if and only if
L >
p
  
1   : (21)
While e1 = 1 is more likely when L is large, a large level of L undermines the selection
of the congruent type in the second election. This deteriorating selection eect decreases
the probability that e2 = 1 occurs. Therefore, policy performance becomes worse in the
second term of the incompetent incumbent when L is large. Condition (21) holds when
L = 1, which occurs when the future challenger is likely to be incompetent. When L = ,
it is satised when v^ is suciently large since  is increasing in v^. On the other hand, the
competent incumbent always chooses his or her preferred policy in the separating equilibrium
because elections cannot make competent dissonant incumbents accountable. Hence, the
competent incumbent chooses et = 1 with probability  for all t 2 f1; 2g.
As in the previous argument, the prediction is more ambiguous when multiple equilibria
are possible. In the pooling equilibrium, the competent incumbent chooses e1 = 1 with
certainty and chooses e2 = 1 with probability . Hence, the eect of a binding term limit on
policy performance is negative for the competent incumbent in this case.
Prediction 5. The relation between competency and the term-limit eect is as follows.
1. In the separating equilibrium, binding term limits aect policy performance only when
incumbent politicians are incompetent. The eect is negative if and only if condition
(21) holds. This condition holds if the future challenger is likely to be incompetent or
if the majority place suciently great importance on the policy choice of politicians,
compared with their competency.
2. In the pooling equilibrium, binding term limits negatively aect the policy performance
of competent politicians.
6 Some evidence on the term-limit eect
Although rigorous tests of our theory are beyond the scope of this paper, this section briey
examines whether the eect of term limits on incumbents' behavior depends on their com-
petency, as Prediction 5 insists, using panel data of U.S. states.
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Many empirical studies have analyzed the term-limit eect. They generally conrm the
prediction of the political agency model that the re-election motive matters for politicians'
behavior. Besley and Case (1995b) compare policy outcomes in U.S. states where governors'
term limits are binding with those in states where term limits are not binding. Using data
from 1950 to 1986, they nd that per capita government expenditures and taxes are higher
in states where governors face binding term limits. This nding means that the incentive
eect matters. In the political agency model, incumbent politicians behave to preserve their
reputation in order to be re-elected. When incumbent politicians cannot seek re-election
by term limits, they do not make eorts to decrease state expenditures and taxes for their
reputations.22
Extending the framework of Besley and Case (1995b), we examine how this term-limit
eect is related with governors' competency levels. We use panel data of 48 continental
U.S. states from 1950 to 2000 and estimate the term-limit eect by running the following
regression:23
pst =s + t + 1 binding limitst + 2 experiencest
+ 3 binding limitst  experiencest + Xst + st;
(22)
where pst is a policy outcome at state s in year t, Xst represents a vector of control variables,
s is a state xed eect, t is a year xed eect, and it is an error term. As a policy
outcome, we use both per capita state spending and total taxes. The variable binding limitst
takes one if the governor in state s at period t cannot run in the next election due to a
term limit, and takes zero otherwise. The variable experiencest refers to the governors'
years of political experience before assuming the oce of governor, which represents the
governors' competency levels. The important dierence from the specication of Besley and
Case (1995b) and Alt et al. (2011) is the interaction term between binding limitst and
experiencest.
Our main concern is the coecient of the interaction term. In the separating equilibrium,
the re-election motive aects policy choice only when the incumbent is incompetent. As a
result, the eect of a binding term limit will be observed only under incompetent governors.24
22Besley and Case (2003) repeat the analysis using extended data from 1950 to 1997 and nd that the
term-limit eect has diminished with the times. Alt et al. (2011) also use the data on U.S. governors to
clarify the incentive and selection eects, exploiting the variation in the length of term limits across states.
They nd positive support for both incentive and selection eects. Using audit reports in Brazil, Ferraz and
Finan (2011b) nd that mayors who can seek re-election engage in signicantly lower corruption than mayors
who face a binding term limit. Since the result is robust even if they restrict the sample to the incumbents
who were actually re-elected, they argue that the observed dierence could not be explained by the selection
eect that more honest politicians tend to be re-elected and face binding term limits.
23We use the data of Alt et al. (2011), which extend the data of Besley and Case (1995b) and are available
at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=hdl:1902.1/14838
24The theoretical prediction on the sign of the coecient of the interaction term is ambiguous, as Predic-
tion 5 describes. Furthermore, if multiple equilibria are possible, this prediction will change if the pooling
equilibrium occurs with suciently high frequency.
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Table 1 provides our estimation results. Columns (1) and (4) do not include the inter-
action term between the binding term limit and the experience of governors. All columns
show that both per capita government spending and taxes are higher in states where the
governors cannot run for re-election, which is consistent with the ndings of Besley and Case
(1995b, 2003). The political experience of the governors is not signicantly related with the
states' policy outcomes. Columns (2) and (5) include the interaction term and show that the
coecient of the interaction term is signicantly negative. This means that the re-election
motive of the governors has a greater inuence on per capita government spending and taxes
when the governors have less political experience. Columns (3) and (6) control political
variables such as the party of the governor, the majority party of the legislature, and the
presence of divided government. The magnitude of the interaction term changes little even
if we control these political variables, while the interaction eect on government spending
becomes statistically insignicant.
The observed behaviors of U.S. governors are consistent with the separating equilibrium
in the model. The re-election motive cannot discipline competent incumbents because of
their advantage of competency and their belief that voters are competency-oriented. As a
result, the eect of binding term limits becomes weaker as the incumbent is more competent.
Of course, we cannot say much about the validity of our model from this simple estimation,
and more careful examination is necessary in future research.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a model of political agency to investigate when voters
prefer an incompetent candidate to a competent one. In this model, the voters elect either
a competent or an incompetent candidate in the rst election. After the winner chooses a
policy, this incumbent contests the second election with a new challenger, and the winner of
this election again chooses a policy. The candidates are heterogeneous in competency levels
and policy preferences. While the voters can observe the candidates' competency, they
cannot observe the candidates' policy preferences. Even though the policy preferences of the
elected incumbent conict with those of the majority, the re-election motive may incentivize
him or her to choose the voters' preferred policy. While the voters obtain benet from
the competency of the elected candidate, how much priority they attach to the candidates'
competency is the voters' private information. Some voters place the candidates' competency
above anything else (type-C), while some others place lower priority on it (type-P).
The model shows that a negative relation can occur between politicians' competency
and political accountability because the condition to making electoral accountability work
is dierent between competent and incompetent incumbents. If the future challenger is
incompetent and the voters are type-C, then the competent incumbent can get re-elected
even if this incumbent has not chosen the voters' preferred policy. Thus, the competent
incumbent has a small incentive to act in the voters' interest when the future challenger is
more likely to be incompetent. Similarly, even if the incompetent incumbent has chosen the
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voters' preferred policy, it does not assure his or her re-election if the future challenger is
competent. Hence, the incompetent incumbent has a small incentive to act in the voters'
interest when the future challenger is more likely to be competent. As a result, a negative
relation between competency and accountability emerges when the probability that the future
challenger is competent is low.
The voters' private information provides another mechanism leading to the negative
relation between competency and accountability. This mechanism shows that the type-P
voters' distrust against the competent candidate can be a self-fullling prophecy. Let us
assume that the type-P voters distrust the competent candidate for some reason and vote
for the incompetent candidate in the rst election, while the type-C voters vote for the
competent candidate. Then, this separating strategy of the voters reveals their type to the
winning candidate; if elected, the competent candidate will perceive that the voters are
type-C and place the maximum value on his or her competency. As a result, the competent
incumbent pursues his or her own interest while in oce, and the negative relation between
competency and accountability emerges. Given this behavior of the competent incumbent,
the type-P voters' distrust against the competent incumbent is rational, even though it is
groundless in the rst place.
When the negative relation between competency and accountability exists, the voters
elect the incompetent candidate if they place suciently great importance on the politicians'
policy choice compared with their competency.
Our model yields several testable predictions. First, an incompetent candidate is elected
when voters care more about the expected policy choice by elected candidates than their
competency. This situation occurs when there is severe policy conict among voters. Second,
we predict that incompetent candidates are more likely to win an election when the expected
quality of the future challenger is low. Third, the chance of incompetent candidates to
win against competent candidates vanishes when the reward for politicians rises enough.
Finally, we predict that the eect of binding term limits on politicians' behavior depends
on their levels of competency. In the separating equilibrium, the incompetent incumbent
is more accountable than the competent incumbent: the incompetent incumbent abandons
his or her preferred policy to step toward voters' preferences in the rst term with positive
probability, while the competent incumbent always chooses his or her preferred policy. Hence,
the incompetent incumbent is more likely to change policies in the last term where he or she
does not need to seek re-election.
We use panel data of 48 continental U.S. states from 1950 to 2000 to examine how
governors' political experience is related with this term-limit eect. Empirical ndings are
consistent with the theoretical prediction. The term-limit eect is stronger in states where
governors have less political experience.
29
References
[1] Acemoglu, D., Egorov, G., Sonin, K., 2013. A political theory of populism. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 128, 771-805.
[2] Algan, Y., Guriev, S., Papaioannou, E., Passari, E., 2017. The European Trust Crisis
and the Rise of Populism. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 309-382.
[3] Alt, J.E., Bueno De Mesquita, E., Rose, S., 2011. Disentangling accountability and
competence in elections: Evidence from U.S. term limits. Journal of Politics, 73(1),
171-186.
[4] Ansolabehere, S., Snyder, J.M., 2000. Valence politics and equilibrium in spatial election
models. Public Choice, 103, .327-336.
[5] Ansolabehere, S., Snyder, J.M., Stewart III, C., 2001. Candidate positioning in US
House elections. American Journal of Political Science, 136-159.
[6] Aragones, E., Palfrey, T.R., 2002. Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored
candidate. Journal of Economic Theory, 103, 131-161.
[7] Aragones, E., Xefteris, D., 2017. Voters' private valuation of candidates' quality. Journal
of Public Economics, 156, 121-130.
[8] Ashworth, S., Bueno de Mesquita, E., 2009. Elections with platform and valence com-
petition. Games and Economic Behavior, 67, 191-216.
[9] Austen-Smith, D., Banks, J.S., 1989. Electoral accountability and incumbency. In: Or-
deshook, P. C. (eds) Models of strategic choice in politics. The University of Michigan
Press. Ann Arbor.
[10] Autor, D., Dorn D., Hanson, G., 2013. The China syndrome: Local labor market eects
of import competition in the United States. American Economic Review, 103, 2121-2168.
[11] Autor, D., Dorn D., Hanson, G., Majlesi, K., 2017. Importing political polarization?
The electoral consequences of rising trade exposure. Unpublished manuscript.
[12] Banks, J.S., Sundaram, R.K., 1993. Adverse selection and moral hazard in a repeated
elections model. In: Barnett, W. A., Hinich, M. J., Schoeld, N.J. (eds) Political econ-
omy: Institutions, information, competition and representation. Cambridge University
Press. New York.
[13] Barro, R.J., 1973. The control of politicians: an economic model. Public choice, 14,
19-42.
[14] Bernhardt, D., Dubey, S., Hughson, E., 2004. Term limits and pork barrel politics.,
Journal of Public Economics, 88, 2383-2422.
30
[15] Bernhardt, D., Camara, O., Squintani, F., 2011. Competence and ideology. Review of
Economic Studies, 78, 487-522.
[16] Besley, T., Case, A., 1995a. Incumbent behavior: vote seeking, tax setting and yardstick
competition., American Economic Review, 85, 25-45.
[17] Besley, T., Case, A., 1995b. Does political accountability aect economic policy choices?
evidence from gubernatorial term limits, Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, 769-98.
[18] Besley, T., Case, A., 2003. Political institutions and policy choices: evidence from the
United States. Journal of Economic Literature, 41, 7-73.
[19] Besley, T., 2006. Principled Agents? The Political Economy of Good Government.
Oxford University Press, Oxford.
[20] Besley, T., Smart, M., 2007. Fiscal restraints and voter welfare. Journal of Public Eco-
nomics, 91, 755-773.
[21] Besley, T., Folke, O., Persson, T., Rickne, J., 2017. Gender quotas and the crisis of the
mediocre man: Theory and evidence from Sweden. American Economic Review, 107,
2204-2242.
[22] Boleslavsky, R., Cotton, C., 2015. Information and extremism in elections. American
Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 7, 165-207.
[23] Buisseret, P., Prato, C., 2016. Electoral control and the human capital of politicians.
Games and Economic Behavior, 98, 34-55.
[24] Buisseret, P., Van Weelden, R., 2017. Crashing the party? Elites, outsiders, and elec-
tions. Unpublished manuscript.
[25] Callander, S., Wilkie, S., 2007. Lies, damned lies, and political campaigns. Games and
Economic Behavior, 60, 262-286.
[26] Callander, S., 2008. Political motivations. Review of Economic Studies, 75, 671-697.
[27] Carrillo, J.D., Castanheira, M., 2008. Information and strategic political polarisation.
Economic Journal, 118, 845-874.
[28] Caselli, F., Morelli, M., 2004. Bad politicians. Journal of Public Economics, 88, 759-782.
[29] Castanheira, M., 2003. Why vote for losers? Journal of the European Economic Asso-
ciation, 1, 1207-1238.
[30] Coate, S., Morris, S., 1995, On the form of transfers to special interests. Journal of
Political Economy, 103, 1210-35.
[31] Di Tella, R., Rotemberg, J.J., 2016. Populism and the return of the \paranoid style":
Some evidence and a simple model of demand for incompetence as insurance against
elite betrayal. NBER Working Paper No. 22975.
31
[32] Duggan, J., Martinelli, C., 2017. The political economy of dynamic elections: Account-
ability, commitment, and responsiveness. Journal of Economic Literature, 55, 916-84.
[33] Dustmann, C., Eichengreen, B., Otten, S., Sapir, A., Tabellini, G., Zoega, G., 2017.
Europe's trust decit: causes and remedies. CEPR Press, London.
[34] Eguia, J.X., Giovannoni, F., 2017. Tactical extremism. Unpublished manuscript.
[35] Ferejohn, J., 1986. Incumbent performance and electoral control. Public choice, 50, 5-25.
[36] Ferraz, C., Finan, F., 2011a. Motivating politicians: The impacts of monetary incentives
on quality and performance. Unpublished manuscript.
[37] Ferraz, C., Finan, F., 2011b. Electoral accountability and corruption: Evidence from
the audits of local governments. American Economic Review, 101, 1274-1311.
[38] Fiorina, M.P., 1973. Electoral margins, constituency inuence, and policy moderation:
A critical assessment. American Politics Quarterly, 1, 479-498.
[39] Gagliarducci, S., Nannicini, T., 2013. Do better paid politicians perform better? Disen-
tangling incentives from selection. Journal of the European Economic Association, 11,
369-398.
[40] Guiso, L., Herrera, H., Morelli, M., Sonno, T., 2017. Demand and supply of populism.
Unpublished manuscript.
[41] Grin, J.D., 2006. Electoral Competition and Democratic Hypothesis. Journal of Poli-
tics, 68, 911-921.
[42] Groseclose, T., 2001. A model of candidate location when one candidate has a valence
advantage. American Journal of Political Science, 45, 862-886.
[43] Hummel, P., 2011. Abstention and signaling in large repeated elections. Games and
Economic Behavior, 72, 586-593.
[44] Karakas, L.D., Mitra, D., 2017. Inequality, redistribution and the rise of outsider can-
didates. Unpublished manuscript.
[45] Kartik, N., McAfee, R.P., 2007. Signaling character in electoral competition. American
Economic Review, 97, 852-870.
[46] Kishishita, D., 2017. Emergence of populism under risk and ambiguity. Unpublished
manuscript.
[47] Kotakorpi, K., Poutvaara, P., 2011. Pay for politicians and candidate selection: An
empirical analysis. Journal of Public Economics, 95, 877-885.
[48] Kselman, D., Niou, E., 2011. Protest voting in plurality elections: a theory of voter
signaling. Public Choice, 148, 395-418.
32
[49] MacRae, D., 1952. The relation between roll call votes and constituencies in the Mas-
sachusetts House of Representatives. American Political Science Review, 46, 1046-1055.
[50] Mattozzi, A., Merlo, A., 2008. Political careers or career politicians? Journal of Public
Economics, 92, 597-608.
[51] Mattozzi, A., Merlo, A., 2015. Mediocracy. Journal of Public Economics, 130, 32-44.
[52] Mattozzi, A., Snowberg, E., 2018. The right type of legislator: A theory of taxation and
representation. Journal of Public Economics, 159, 54-65.
[53] McMurray, J., 2017. Voting as communicating: Mandates, multiple candidates, and the
signaling voter's curse. Games and Economic Behavior, 102, 199-223.
[54] Meirowitz, A., 2005. Informational party primaries and strategic ambiguity. Journal of
Theoretical Politics, 17, 107-136.
[55] Meirowitz, A., Shotts, K.W., 2009. Pivots versus signals in elections. Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, 144, 744-771.
[56] Meirowitz, A., Tucker, J.A., 2007. Run Boris run: strategic voting in sequential elec-
tions. Journal of Politics, 69, 88-99.
[57] Messner, M., Polborn, M.K., 2004. Paying politicians. Journal of Public Economics, 88,
.2423-2445.
[58] Mosca, L., 2014. The ve star movement: Exception or vanguard in Europe? The
International Spectator, 49, 36-52.
[59] Myatt, D.P., 2017. A theory of protest voting. Economic Journal, 127, 1527-1567.
[60] Padro-i-Miquel, G., Snowberg, E., 2012. The lesser evil: Executive accountability with
partisan supporters. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 24, 19-45.
[61] Piketty, T., 2000. Voting as communicating. Review of Economic Studies, 67, 169-191.
[62] Rauch, J., 2015. Amateurs in the oval oce: Why Americans tend more
and more to want inexperienced presidential candidates. The Atlantic. Avail-
able at https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/11/amateurs-in-the-oval-
oce/407830/
[63] Razin, R., 2003. Signaling and election motivations in a voting model with common
values and responsive candidates. Econometrica, 71, 1083-1119.
[64] Rogo, K., 1990. Equilibrium political budget cycles. American Economic Review, 80,
21-36.
[65] Shotts, K.W., 2006. A signaling model of repeated elections. Social Choice and Welfare,
27, 251-261.
33
[66] Stone, W.J., Simas, E.N., 2010. Candidate Valence in U. S. House and Ideological
Elections Positions. American Journal of Political Science, 54, 371-388.
34
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. The equilibrium level of L and  
 can be described as an intersection of the graphs
of L( ) and  (L). The function L( ) is non-decreasing in  , and  (L) is non-increasing
in L (see (4) and (14)).
Let us consider the case of v^ > 1=(1  ). In this case,  is in (0; 1). When q 2 (q
L
; qL),
 is also in (0; 1) as described in Figure 4. When q  q
L
,   0. Hence,   = 0 and L = 1.
Note that if q = q
L
(  = 0), then L 2 [; 1) is weakly dominated by L = 1. Similarly,
when q  qL,   1. Hence,   = 1 and L = 0. If q = qL (  = 1), then L 2 (0; ] is
weakly dominated by L = 0.
Finally, let us consider the case of v^  1=(1   ). In this case,   0. If q  q
L
, then
  0 holds. Hence,   = 0 and L = 1. When q = qL, L 2 [0; 1) is weakly dominated
by L = 1. If q > qL, then
 > 0 and hence   =  = 0. Note that, when v^ = 1=(1   ),
 2 (0;  ] is weakly dominated by  = 0.
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. We rst show that Vi(i) is a monotonically increasing function. Substituting (5)
into (17), we obtain
VH(H) = + [+ (1  )H ][v + (+ Hv)] + (1  )(1  H)(q+ v): (A1)
Using (1), it is rewritten as
VH(H) = + [+ (1  )H ](v + ) + v + (1  )(1  H)(q+ v): (A2)
Hence, we obtain
V 0H(H) = (1  )[(1  )v + (1  q)] > 0: (A3)
Similarly, by substituting (6) into (18), we obtain
VL(L) = [+ (1  )L] [v + fqmaxfLv; + vg+ (1  q)Lvg]
+ (1  )(1  L)(q+ v):
(A4)
First, we consider the case of L 2 [0; ]. In this case, since   0, the condition (1 )v  
holds. Using (1), (A4) is rewritten as
VL(L) = [+ (1  )L]v + v + (1  )(1  L)(q+ v); (A5)
and we obtain
V 0L(L) = (1  )[(1  )v   q] > 0;
where the last inequality holds from (1  )v  .
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Next, we consider the case of L 2 (; 1]. Similar to the previous case, (A4) can be
rewritten as
VL(L) = [+ (1  )L][v + q(+ v)] + (1  q)v + (1  )(1  L)(q+ v); (A6)
and we obtain
V 0L(L) = (1  )[1  (1  q)]v > 0: (A7)
Finally, the last claim in Lemma 3 can be easily obtained as
VH() VL() = +f[+(1 )]+qvg qmaxf[+(1 )](+v); vg > 0: (A8)
Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. From (A2),
VH(0) = + [v + (+ v)] + (1  )(q+ v): (A9)
Hence, for   , VH(0)  VL() if and only if
  [1 + (1  q)] + q(1  )v^
(1  )[1  (1  q)]v^ ; (A10)
where the right-hand side is decreasing in v^. When  = 1, the condition (A10) can be written
as
v^  1 + (1  q)
(1  )(1  )  v(q): (A11)
When  = , from (16), the condition (A10) can be written as
g(v^)  (1  )(1  )v^2   [2 + q(1  )]v^   [1 + (1  q)]  0: (A12)
The quadratic equation g(v^) = 0 has two distinct real solutions:
v^ =
[2 + q(1  )]p2[2 + q(1  )]2 + 4(1  )(1  )[1 + (1  q)]
2(1  )(1  ) : (A13)
We dene v(q) as
v(q)  [2 + q(1  )] +
p
2[2 + q(1  )]2 + 4(1  )(1  )[1 + (1  q)]
2(1  )(1  ) : (A14)
Since g(v(q)) < 0, in the range of v^ 2 (v(q); v(q)], VH(0)  VL(), and VH(0) < VL() when
v^ > v(q).
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Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Proof of 1. In the range of v(q) < v^  v(q), VH(H)  VL(L) holds when L  .
From Lemma 2, L   if q > qL. Hence, if v(q) < v^  v(q) and q > qL, then a pooling
equilibrium uniquely exists.
If q  q
L
, Lemma 2 shows that L = 1. Let us assume that the majority use the sepa-
rating strategy. Then, the majority of type-P obtain VH(0) from voting for the competent
candidate and obtain VL(1) from voting for the incompetent candidate. Since the condition
v^ > v(q) means VL(1) > VH(0), the separating strategy is optimal for the majority in this
case.
Finally, if q  q
H
, then a pooling equilibrium exists because the competent dissonant
incumbent chooses e1 = 1 if the majority use the pooling strategy. As we have discussed
above, the competent dissonant incumbent has a large incentive to choose e1 = 1 when
H is small, which takes the minimum value  when the majority use the pooling strategy.
The condition q  q
H
assures that choosing e1 = 1 is optimal for the competent dissonant
incumbent when the majority use the pooling strategy, which makes the pooling strategy
optimal for the majority.
Proof of 2. The separating equilibrium also exists in the case of v^  v(q) because it
means that VL(L) > VH(0) for L  . If q  qH , then a pooling equilibrium also exists as
we have shown.
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